Noticias Armada Rusa
Pues le toca al gráfico habitual sobre las entregas de buques y submarinos para la Armada Rusa en el pasado 2025.
Por ahora cito esos. Es probable que se conozca alguno más con el paso del tiempo porque si atendemos a las informaciones oficiales faltarían algunos buques por citar.
Datos de interés
Kalashnikov ofrece en su amplio catálogo una serie de drones de ataque (Kamikazes) que darán qué hablar en los próximos años y como son producto estrella toca reunirlos para que sea más fácil identificarlos.
En Army2019 Kalashnikov presentó su nuevo drone-kamikaze ZALA 'Lantset'...
Ya se conocen más detalles del drone Lantset o mejor dicho de los drones Lantset...
Por la presentación de Kalashnikov, al menos habrá dos versiones del Lantset...
Hablamos de:
Lantset 1, el hermano menor, con una velocidad entre 80 a 110 km/h y una autonomía de 30 minutos. O sea, unos 47 km a velocidad media. Su carga será de 1 kg y su peso máximo al despegue de 5 kgs.
Lantset 3, el hermano mayor, con una velocidad entre 80 a 110 km/h y una autonomía de 40 minutos. O sea, unos 63 kms a velocidad media. Su carga será de 3 kg y su peso máximo al despegue de 12 kgs.
Quizá haya que preguntarse si habrá un Lantset 2.
El vídeo promocional los muestra atacando diversos blancos, uno de ellos en movimiento.
Como se suele decir, el mercado manda y Kalashnikov se está amoldando a él de una forma sobresaliente.
Se completaron las pruebas del drone Lantset...
Kalashnikov presentó su nuevo drone-kamikaze, el 'KUB'...
C. The Russian Federation By contrast, there are reasons to be concerned about the conformity of Russian nuclear policy with wellestablished international legal rules and principles. President Vladimir Putin's June 2020 declaration of nuclear weapons policy speaks in general terms, for the most part unproblematically, about the importance of nuclear deterrence, and declares that Russia "reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy." Russia argues that its doctrine conforms with international law, that it has nuclear weapons only for defensive and deterrent purposes, and that they would only be in extremis, and one hopes that this is indeed the case. Worryingly, however, Putin's guidance specifies that one "possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation" is upon "arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies" - apparently irrespective of the circumstances of such attack (e.g., whether or not the missiles are armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, or whether the "territory" in question is inhabited by anyone). This explicit heedlessness to circumstance is apparently not an accident of phrasing, but is the very point: as two senior officers from the Russian General Staff recently reemphasized in the official military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, "[a]ny attacking missile will be perceived as carrying a nuclear warhead." Especially coming from a country that itself possesses a very large arsenal of ballistic missiles that are capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, it is not obvious - to say the least - how such a threat of nuclear use in response to any missile attack would always be consistent with thejus ad bel/um requirements of necessity and proportionality. One should certainly be careful not to draw firm conclusions about doctrine from press commentary, but more clarity and transparency on such issues is essential, for these points raise potentially troubling questions.Another disturbing sign comes with Russia's development of the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drones that it apparently intends to fit with multi-megaton nuclear warheads and launch across the ocean in wartime in order to inundate U.S. coastal cities with radioactive tsunamis. The very operational concept of the Poseidon - involving an enormously destructive warhead dispatched without possibily of recall on a transoceanic passage that could take days- raises serious questions about the extent to which it could be used in compliance applicable international legal rules and principles. Questions might also arise in connection with the socalled Perimeter - or Mertvaya Ruka ("Dead Hand") - system that some media accounts claim was built by the Soviets in the 1980s and would seem to have been kept in service, and the existence of which the commander of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces apparently confirmed in 2011. If one assumes that this system actually exists and functions as reported, if switched on by the high command in time of crisis, Perimeter would apparently automatically launch the country's nuclear arsenal if it detected nuclear explosions in Russia and its computer brain could not thereafter establish communications links to the General Staff. For anyone concerned with the morality of nuclear weapons, Perimeter surely raises disturbing questions. Can Russia defend Perimeter as anything more than just a vindictive and barbaric fun-house mirror vision of apocalyptic retribution? Russia would seem to have a lot of explaining to do. It is thus particularly disturbing, that Russian officials in another arena - specifically, cyberspace - have recently begun openly to question the applicability of LOAC principles to the complexities of modern armed conflict. As I have noted elsewhere " ... Russian government officials ... have recently tried to walk back aspects of their prior commitment to and acceptance of important declarations ... about the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber operations in armed conflict. Where once Moscow agreed with the common sense and morally inescapable position that IHL principles such as military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity would apply to cyber attacks in wartime just as they apply to kinetic or any other form of attack, now the Kremlin'srepresentatives have begun to equivocate, suggesting that it might be 'impossible' to apply IHL in cyberspace because it is hard to distinguish between 'civilian' and 'military' objects in that domain. "Such claims are false - for it is not impossible to apply IHL in cyberspace, and it is not impossibly hard to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets in cyberspace during armed conflict - and are quite alarming, inasmuch as such Russian logic would seem also to justify indiscriminate massacres of civilians during armed conflict if it is 'too hard' to distinguish between civilians and combatants. With ongoing Russian efforts to lay the groundwork for attacks using cyber assets against critical infrastructure that supports basic necessities of civilian life, Moscow's effort to retreat from acknowledging the applicability in cyberspace conflict of the IHL principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity suggests that the Kremlin is comfortable with needlessness, disproportion, indiscriminateness, and inhumanity in contemplating future cyber attacks against civilians." With Russian officials suggesting it would be futile even to try to apply the law where it is difficult to distinguish between civilian and military actors, and employing nuclear tools such as Poseidon (and perhaps Perimeter), this raises real questions about whether Russia would follow legal principles in the conduct of nuclear operations. This should concern the rest of the world and shou Id be a matter of conspicuous attention - not least by the disarmament community, but also in the ongoing Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) and the continuing arms control talks between U.S. and Russian officials over nuclear doctrine and transparency.
Noticias Etiopía
Durante la exhibición aérea Aviation Expo 2026 en Addis Abeba en Etiopía se pudo ver este modelo de drone:
Muchos medios y expertos están hablando de un drone ruso Orión E pero eso no está nada claro, vamos a comparar esa foto con algunas de los Orión rusos en sus distintas versiones:
En los gráficos anteriores vemos arriba, en ambos, el drone que se ha presentado en Etiopía. Abajo dos versiones del drone Orión ruso para comparar.
En mí opinión, el drone que se ha visto en Aviation Expo 2026 (enero 2026) tiene unas líneas generales y una configuración comparable en algunos puntos con el Orión ruso pero no es un Orión ruso.
Quizá sea un diseño local o de alguna empresa que supongo conoceremos pronto. Mientras tanto, ahí queda el asunto porque no hay más información.
Continuará...
