Fuentes de la industria rusa han señalado que las pruebas del nuevo drone submarino 'Poseidón' ya comenzaron ...
Источник: в России начались подводные испытания беспилотного аппарата "Посейдон"
Dos datos a tener en cuenta ...
Источник: стратегический подводный беспилотник "Посейдон" получит скорость более 200 км/ч
Cota de inmersión más de 1.000 m y velocidad 110 nudos (algo más de 200 km/h).
Creo que después del torpedo-supercavitante 'Shkvall' será lo más rápido bajo el agua.
Según la agencia TASS que cita fuentes de la industria militar rusa, la Armada Rusa planea desplegar 32 drones 'Poseidón' ...
Источник: ВМФ планирует поставить на боевое дежурство до 32 аппаратов "Посейдон"
Según estas informaciones una de las plataformas para este nuevo sistema será el submarino 'Jabarovsk' ...
Otra de las plataformas que podrá utilizar el drone 'Poseidón' será la modificación del proyecto 949A, el proyecto 09852 ...
La cantidad de 32 drones 'Poseidón' que se citan sale de desplegar 2 plataformas en la flota del pacífico y otras 2 en la flota del Norte. Cada una con capacidad para 8 drones 'Poseidón'. 16 por flota.
Se completó la fase clave de pruebas del 'Poseidón' ...
Шойгу доложил о завершении испытаний подводного беспилотника "Посейдон"
Durante las pruebas el drone 'Poseidón' demostró lo que se esperaba de él, alcance ilimitado y velocidad por encima de los 200 km/h ...
испытания реактора "Посейдона" подтвердили его дальность и скорость
Eso le permitirá burlar cualquier defensa ...
Convirtiéndolo en invulnerable, según afirman fuentes de la industria rusa citadas por la agencia TASS.
Las pruebas de mar de la factoría se inician este verano ...
Ya se le ha visto saliendo al ruedo ...
Por las formas que se ven en el vídeo de marras la plataforma de pruebas sería el submarino proyecto 20120 B-90 'Sarov' ...
El primer submarino nuclear nodriza para los drones 'Poseidón' será botado en primavera ...
La solución del drone 'Poseidón' burlará los sistemas de defensa que EEUU pueda desplegar ...
"Посейдон" обесценит все попытки США создать систему глобальной ПРО - эксперт
Las pruebas de mar de la factoría se inician este verano ...
заводские ходовые испытания "Посейдона" начнутся летом 2019 года
Ya se le ha visto saliendo al ruedo ...
Por las formas que se ven en el vídeo de marras la plataforma de pruebas sería el submarino proyecto 20120 B-90 'Sarov' ...
El primer submarino nuclear nodriza para los drones 'Poseidón' será botado en primavera ...
Первую ядерную подлодку-беспилотник "Посейдон" спустят на воду весной
La solución del drone 'Poseidón' burlará los sistemas de defensa que EEUU pueda desplegar ...
"Посейдон" обесценит все попытки США создать систему глобальной ПРО - эксперт
Las pruebas con el drone 'Poseidón' a bordo del submarino 'Belgorod' llevarán 2 años ...
Испытания "Посейдона" займут около двух лет, сообщил источник
Mientras tanto desde EEUU se afirma que no lo tendrán operativo antes del 2027 ...
Russia's nuclear-armed underwater drone may be ready for war in eight years
Por su parte los rusos afirman que el Poseidón entrará en servicio mucho antes de lo que creen en EEUU ...
В Госдуме отреагировали на сообщения американских СМИ о "Посейдоне"
En otoño del 2020 se llevará a cabo el primer lanzamiento de un drone Poseidón...
Источник рассказал, когда пройдет первый пуск "Посейдона"
Se llevará a cabo desde el submarino nuclear 'Belgorod' que será entregado a la Armada Rusa en septiembre.
"Без ограничений". Военный эксперт о беспилотном аппарате "Посейдон"
El Ministerio de defensa ruso anuncia que se entra en la fase final en el trabajo con el sistema 'Poseidón' y la plataforma que lo utilizará...
Минобороны РФ сообщило о завершающей стадии работ над комплексом с ядерными подлодками-беспилотниками "Посейдон"
Pronto será completado.
Desde la visión oficial estadounidense...
C. The Russian Federation By contrast, there are reasons to be concerned about the conformity of Russian nuclear policy with wellestablished international legal rules and principles. President Vladimir Putin's June 2020 declaration of nuclear weapons policy speaks in general terms, for the most part unproblematically, about the importance of nuclear deterrence, and declares that Russia "reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy." Russia argues that its doctrine conforms with international law, that it has nuclear weapons only for defensive and deterrent purposes, and that they would only be in extremis, and one hopes that this is indeed the case. Worryingly, however, Putin's guidance specifies that one "possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation" is upon "arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies" - apparently irrespective of the circumstances of such attack (e.g., whether or not the missiles are armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, or whether the "territory" in question is inhabited by anyone). This explicit heedlessness to circumstance is apparently not an accident of phrasing, but is the very point: as two senior officers from the Russian General Staff recently reemphasized in the official military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, "[a]ny attacking missile will be perceived as carrying a nuclear warhead." Especially coming from a country that itself possesses a very large arsenal of ballistic missiles that are capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, it is not obvious - to say the least - how such a threat of nuclear use in response to any missile attack would always be consistent with thejus ad bel/um requirements of necessity and proportionality. One should certainly be careful not to draw firm conclusions about doctrine from press commentary, but more clarity and transparency on such issues is essential, for these points raise potentially troubling questions.Another disturbing sign comes with Russia's development of the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drones that it apparently intends to fit with multi-megaton nuclear warheads and launch across the ocean in wartime in order to inundate U.S. coastal cities with radioactive tsunamis. The very operational concept of the Poseidon - involving an enormously destructive warhead dispatched without possibily of recall on a transoceanic passage that could take days- raises serious questions about the extent to which it could be used in compliance applicable international legal rules and principles. Questions might also arise in connection with the socalled Perimeter - or Mertvaya Ruka ("Dead Hand") - system that some media accounts claim was built by the Soviets in the 1980s and would seem to have been kept in service, and the existence of which the commander of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces apparently confirmed in 2011. If one assumes that this system actually exists and functions as reported, if switched on by the high command in time of crisis, Perimeter would apparently automatically launch the country's nuclear arsenal if it detected nuclear explosions in Russia and its computer brain could not thereafter establish communications links to the General Staff. For anyone concerned with the morality of nuclear weapons, Perimeter surely raises disturbing questions. Can Russia defend Perimeter as anything more than just a vindictive and barbaric fun-house mirror vision of apocalyptic retribution? Russia would seem to have a lot of explaining to do. It is thus particularly disturbing, that Russian officials in another arena - specifically, cyberspace - have recently begun openly to question the applicability of LOAC principles to the complexities of modern armed conflict. As I have noted elsewhere " ... Russian government officials ... have recently tried to walk back aspects of their prior commitment to and acceptance of important declarations ... about the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber operations in armed conflict. Where once Moscow agreed with the common sense and morally inescapable position that IHL principles such as military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity would apply to cyber attacks in wartime just as they apply to kinetic or any other form of attack, now the Kremlin'srepresentatives have begun to equivocate, suggesting that it might be 'impossible' to apply IHL in cyberspace because it is hard to distinguish between 'civilian' and 'military' objects in that domain. "Such claims are false - for it is not impossible to apply IHL in cyberspace, and it is not impossibly hard to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets in cyberspace during armed conflict - and are quite alarming, inasmuch as such Russian logic would seem also to justify indiscriminate massacres of civilians during armed conflict if it is 'too hard' to distinguish between civilians and combatants. With ongoing Russian efforts to lay the groundwork for attacks using cyber assets against critical infrastructure that supports basic necessities of civilian life, Moscow's effort to retreat from acknowledging the applicability in cyberspace conflict of the IHL principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity suggests that the Kremlin is comfortable with needlessness, disproportion, indiscriminateness, and inhumanity in contemplating future cyber attacks against civilians." With Russian officials suggesting it would be futile even to try to apply the law where it is difficult to distinguish between civilian and military actors, and employing nuclear tools such as Poseidon (and perhaps Perimeter), this raises real questions about whether Russia would follow legal principles in the conduct of nuclear operations. This should concern the rest of the world and shou Id be a matter of conspicuous attention - not least by the disarmament community, but also in the ongoing Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) and the continuing arms control talks between U.S. and Russian officials over nuclear doctrine and transparency.
Siguen adelante con las pruebas del Belgorod, la primera plataforma que disfrutará del drone submarino Poseidón...
Además se anuncia que la base desde la que operarán los drones Poseidón estará preparada para 2022...
Se habla de instalaciones como talleres, mantenimiento y almacenamiento donde se trabajará con los drones submarinos Poseidón y, se sobreentiende, con las plataformas que lo operarán.
La parejita (drone Poseidón y submarino Belgorod) iniciará pruebas conjuntas en mayo de 2021...
Lo hará porque comienza el deshielo en el mar Blanco.
Unas ideas de cómo podría emplearse el drone Poseidón...
Un artículo sobre el tema...
Vuelve a la actualidad por esta captura satélite...
Es el buque Akademik Aleksandrov en Severodvinsk con al menos un UUV Poseidón en la explanada del muelle de carga.
El cálculo inicial de 15 m no fue mal tirado porque la captura satélite marca entorno a 17 m de longitud...
Las instalaciones para que operen los submarinos Belgorod y los clase Jabarvosk estarán completadas a comienzos de 2024
Son las plataformas que utilizarán el drone Poseidón.
Los reactores para los Poseidón ya está listos, tras pasar las pruebas pertinentes
Los primeros test del Poseidón desde el nodriza Belgorod se iniciarán en el verano de 2023
Uno de los problemas que tiene EEUU con este tipo de nuevos vectores rusos es que no están englobados en ningún acuerdo bilateral y, por lo tanto, Rusia no está obligada a informar sobre ellos y eso es lo que pretende, por ahora
Imagen satélite actualizada (14 de junio del 2023) nuevo
