Hace años la Armada Rusa (durante un tiempo también la soviética) operó una clase de submarinos para cometidos especiales que recibió el nombre genérico de 'Pirañas', eran el proyecto 865 ...
Con el paso de los años se los ha llegado a conocer al dedillo, como se suele decir, e incluso las empresas rusas los presentan en sus shows con todo tipo de detalles para mostrar el hito que supusieron ...
La transparencia no les hizo perder ni un poquito de glamour y los Piraña han quedado como algo legendario. Incluso hay quienes los vieron como actores principales en situaciones recientes, como la paranoia submarina sueca:
Ofrece el transporte de 6 buceadores militares y tiene una tripulación de 9 personas.
Este último es una versión mejorada del P-550 que incorpora un segmento más de unos 5 mts de longitud que aloja una planta VNEU (AIP) que le permite navegar 1.200 millas bajo el agua, 7,5 veces más que la versión sin esta sistema.
A día de hoy no se ha anunciado ningún contrato de estos proyectos.
La versión P750B incorporará el sistema de misiles Caliber ...
Lo cito porque es un desarrollo relativamente reciente también encaminado a las acciones de los buceadores militares.
No hubo anuncio alguno que indicase que los Tritón 2 o los Tritón NN hayan sido adquiridos así que toca esperar a que aparezca o a que se vean en algún vídeo
Reportaje de TV Zvezda sobre las Pirañas originales y lo que hubo y hay en esta categoría
Según este artículo, entre las 11:00 a.m. y las 1:00 p.m. del 29 de junio del 2017 un minisumergible ruso clase Tritón NN violó las aguas suecas adentrándose en la zona del puerto de Galve
Otra de las plataformas que podrá utilizar el drone 'Poseidón' será la modificación del proyecto 949A, el proyecto 09852 ...
La cantidad de 32 drones 'Poseidón' que se citan sale de desplegar 2 plataformas en la flota del pacífico y otras 2 en la flota del Norte. Cada una con capacidad para 8 drones 'Poseidón'. 16 por flota.
Se completó la fase clave de pruebas del 'Poseidón' ...
C. The Russian Federation
By contrast, there are reasons to be concerned about
the conformity of Russian nuclear policy with wellestablished international legal rules and principles.
President Vladimir Putin's June 2020 declaration of
nuclear weapons policy speaks in general terms, for the
most part unproblematically, about the importance of
nuclear deterrence, and declares that Russia
"reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in
response to the use of nuclear and other types of
weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its
allies, as well as in the event of aggression against
the Russian Federation with the use of
conventional weapons when the very existence of
the state is in jeopardy."
Russia argues that its doctrine conforms with
international law, that it has nuclear weapons only for
defensive and deterrent purposes, and that they would
only be in extremis, and one hopes that this is indeed the
case.
Worryingly, however, Putin's guidance specifies that
one "possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian
Federation" is upon "arrival of reliable data on a launch of
ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian
Federation and/or its allies" - apparently irrespective of
the circumstances of such attack (e.g., whether or not the
missiles are armed with conventional or nuclear
warheads, or whether the "territory" in question is
inhabited by anyone). This explicit heedlessness to
circumstance is apparently not an accident of phrasing,
but is the very point: as two senior officers from the
Russian General Staff recently reemphasized in the official
military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, "[a]ny attacking
missile will be perceived as carrying a nuclear warhead."
Especially coming from a country that itself possesses
a very large arsenal of ballistic missiles that are capable of
carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, it is not
obvious - to say the least - how such a threat of nuclear
use in response to any missile attack would always be
consistent with thejus ad bel/um requirements of
necessity and proportionality. One should certainly be
careful not to draw firm conclusions about doctrine from
press commentary, but more clarity and transparency on
such issues is essential, for these points raise potentially
troubling questions.
Another disturbing sign comes with Russia's
development of the Poseidon nuclear-powered
underwater drones that it apparently intends to fit with
multi-megaton nuclear warheads and launch across the
ocean in wartime in order to inundate U.S. coastal cities
with radioactive tsunamis. The very operational concept
of the Poseidon - involving an enormously destructive
warhead dispatched without possibily of recall on a transoceanic passage that could take days- raises serious
questions about the extent to which it could be used in
compliance applicable international legal rules and
principles.
Questions might also arise in connection with the socalled Perimeter - or Mertvaya Ruka ("Dead Hand") -
system that some media accounts claim was built by the
Soviets in the 1980s and would seem to have been kept in
service, and the existence of which the commander of
Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces apparently confirmed in
2011. If one assumes that this system actually exists and
functions as reported, if switched on by the high command
in time of crisis, Perimeter would apparently automatically
launch the country's nuclear arsenal if it detected nuclear
explosions in Russia and its computer brain could not
thereafter establish communications links to the General
Staff. For anyone concerned with the morality of nuclear
weapons, Perimeter surely raises disturbing questions.
Can Russia defend Perimeter as anything more than just a
vindictive and barbaric fun-house mirror vision of
apocalyptic retribution? Russia would seem to have a lot
of explaining to do.
It is thus particularly disturbing, that Russian officials
in another arena - specifically, cyberspace - have recently
begun openly to question the applicability of LOAC
principles to the complexities of modern armed conflict.
As I have noted elsewhere
" ... Russian government officials ... have recently
tried to walk back aspects of their prior
commitment to and acceptance of important
declarations ... about the applicability of
international humanitarian law to cyber
operations in armed conflict. Where once
Moscow agreed with the common sense and
morally inescapable position that IHL principles
such as military necessity, proportionality,
distinction, and humanity would apply to cyber
attacks in wartime just as they apply to kinetic or
any other form of attack, now the Kremlin's
representatives have begun to equivocate,
suggesting that it might be 'impossible' to apply
IHL in cyberspace because it is hard to distinguish
between 'civilian' and 'military' objects in that
domain.
"Such claims are false - for it is not impossible to
apply IHL in cyberspace, and it is not impossibly
hard to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate targets in cyberspace during armed
conflict - and are quite alarming, inasmuch as
such Russian logic would seem also to justify
indiscriminate massacres of civilians during
armed conflict if it is 'too hard' to distinguish
between civilians and combatants. With ongoing
Russian efforts to lay the groundwork for attacks
using cyber assets against critical infrastructure
that supports basic necessities of civilian life,
Moscow's effort to retreat from acknowledging
the applicability in cyberspace conflict of the IHL
principles of necessity, proportionality,
distinction, and humanity suggests that the
Kremlin is comfortable with needlessness,
disproportion, indiscriminateness, and inhumanity
in contemplating future cyber attacks against
civilians."
With Russian officials suggesting it would be futile
even to try to apply the law where it is difficult to
distinguish between civilian and military actors, and
employing nuclear tools such as Poseidon (and perhaps
Perimeter), this raises real questions about whether Russia
would follow legal principles in the conduct of nuclear
operations. This should concern the rest of the world and
shou Id be a matter of conspicuous attention - not least by
the disarmament community, but also in the ongoing
Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) and the continuing arms
control talks between U.S. and Russian officials over
nuclear doctrine and transparency.
Se habla de instalaciones como talleres, mantenimiento y almacenamiento donde se trabajará con los drones submarinos Poseidón y, se sobreentiende, con las plataformas que lo operarán.
La parejita (drone Poseidón y submarino Belgorod) iniciará pruebas conjuntas en mayo de 2021...
Uno de los problemas que tiene EEUU con este tipo de nuevos vectores rusos es que no están englobados en ningún acuerdo bilateral y, por lo tanto, Rusia no está obligada a informar sobre ellos y eso es lo que pretende, por ahora
La planta de propulsión nuclear diseñada para el Poseidón podrá ser utilizada en la explotación de los recursos submarinos, incluyendo los minerales nuevo
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